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This paper presents an analysis of the forces of the
11

new imperialism 11 that led Italy to war with Turkey in 1911-

1912. The interests of the Powers of Europe and America in
the area of the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa are examined. The focal point is a resum6 of the military aspects
of the Tripolitan War.

The concluding chapters deal with

diplomatic reactions to Italy's conquest of Tripolitania and
the judgment that Italy did not benefit from her imperial
adventure.
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PREFACE
Africa, long the dark and mysterious continent, has for centuries
attracted the imagination of foreigners.
in search of many things:

For centuries, they have come

gold, diamonds, slaves, adventure~ converts -

and land.
The last great race for colonies in Africa began in the final
quarter of the nineteenth century.

The days of the individual adventurer,

explorer, and missionary were eclipsed by the renewed interests of nationstates in the continent of Africa.

Individuals, like Britishers Hugh

Clapperton, Robert Moffat, David Livingston, Richard Burton and John
Speke, who explored and opened new areas, were supplanted by nations that
wanted to occupy and colonize new lands.
Comparatively little land in North Africa remained to be annexed
by foreign Powers during the 11 scramble for colonies 11 in the age of the
11

new imperialism 11 •

The scramble, about which this thesis is concerned,

focused upon the northern coast of Africa, and the available lands
quickly disappeared.

In 1830, Algeria fell to the French.

France acquired Tunisia.

In 1881,

England, in the following year, closed off the

eastern portion of the land mass by assuming a protectorate over Egypt.
At the turn of the century, only Morocco and Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica had not been swallowed up by European states. The absorption
of Morocco by France began in 1904. The process was near completion in
1911. Only Tripolitania and Cyrenaica remained.

Italy, the least of the Great Powers, had long sought the remaining prize.

In September, 1911, she launched the last colonial

invasion of North African lands.

Italy, the least of the Great Powers

of Europe, was the last of the Powers to gain a foothold in North
Africa. The occupation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911 was followed by years of conflict and bloodshed.

Title to the land that Italy

had so idealistically coveted, was won by a war that lasted little more
than a year.

The attempted pacification that followed was virtually

complete by 1932.

From 1932 until ,1943, Italy had opportunity to

harvest the fruits of her stolen land.

Events proved that Italy, as

the last of the imperial colonizers, benefited the least in the scramble
for colonies in the age of the new imperialism.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION, IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM
Every man, woman and child in Great Britain has ten colonial
subjects, black, brown and yellow. For every acre in France, there
are twenty in the French colonies and protectorates. Italy is onesixth as large as her colonies; Portugal, one twenty-third; Belgium,
one-eightieth. The nations of Western Europe are dwarfs beside their
colonial possessions. l
Summarizing the results of imperial and colonial drives by 1914,
Professor P. T. Moon clearly illustrates the lengths to which European
powers had gone in the acquisition of territory.

History is replete

with stories of the conquest of one country by another, militarily,
economically and politically. The "new imperialism" of the late nineteenth century no longer was tied to the denotation of Imperator and
could II~ .. be taken to mean simply the rule or control, political or
economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people over other
similar groups, or perhaps one might better say the disposition, urge
or striving to establish such rule or control. 11 2
In the following pages an attempt will be made to show the
aspirations and interests of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy
in the area of the Mediterranean, specifically in North Africa. An
attempt will also be made to analyze the relationships of these nations
and to trace the origins of the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912 to the imperial and colonial policies of the Great Powers in North Africa. The
greater questions of imperial and colonial drives in the remainder of
l
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Africa, the Far East and the Balkans will be mentioned only as they impinge upon the questions at hand.

Tangentially, the interests of

America, the new world Power, in the Mediterranean and her reaction to
the war between Italy and Turkey will be reviewed in the perspective of
the times.

The latter pages of this thesis are devoted to a recapitula-

tion of the significant events of the Tripolitan War itself, and to the
diplomatic reactions of the Great Powers to that struggle between Italy
and Turkey that stands as a minor milepost on the road to the Great War
of 1914.
War in Tripoli in 1911 was the direct outgrowth of the imperial
and colonial policies of the Great Powers in the preceding decades.
Italy, the least of the Great Powers, during that time capitalized upon
a unique opportunity to recapture for her people the eminent stature of
her Roman predecessors.

Italy 1 s 11 place in the sun 11 was gained by imple-

menting the nineteenth century tools available to her.

The tools of the

time were favorable alliances, and for Italy in Africa, the employment
of naked imperialism.
The 11 why 11 of imperialism is a question that does not fully admit
of an answer.

Some of the salient motives toward an imperial policy by

a nation-state, however, may be assessed.

In the context of the times,

impetus for the new imperialism came from the aftermath of the Industrial
Revolution - a cataclysmic revolution in the life styles of people and
nations.
The way for world-wide colonial expansion was made clear by
burgeoning material developments in industry, capital and transportation

3

facilities.

The economic vitality of the last quarter of the nineteenth

century can be seen in the following:

France paid Gennany a war debt

of $1,000,000,000 in only two years and then loaned Germany $250,000,000
for industrial development; the German level of trade in 1890 was more
than $1,700,000,000; the English level of trade increased from
t547,000,000 in 1870 to t749,000,000 in 1890; the estimated wealth of
Europe in 1900 was approximately $240,000,000,000.

In this period, man's

productive power was multiplied through the use of steam and electricity.
It was the time of transition from an agricultural to an industrial
Europe.3
Economic forces were primary in popularizing the new imperialism.
Other forces that served to justify that imperialism ranged from religion
and metaphysics to biology and astronomy, and included the vast spectrum
in between.4
The tenor of the age was geared to imperialistic endeavors. The
economic motive may have been the underpinning of imperialism, but its
ideological super structure was often garbed in the cloth of the flag
and the mission of Europeans to save the 11 inferior 11 people of the world.
A "place in the sun 11 and the "white man's burden" were part and parcel
of the thinking of the age.

In the purely pragmatic sense, beyond that

of trade, colonies offered an outlet for people.

In the decade of 1885

to 1895, the approximate increase in population per year was as follows:
Gennany •
Italy . • . • .
Great Britain

540,000
150,000
280,000

4

Emigration for the period 1878 to 1888:
Germany . • •
Italy . • • •
Great Britain •.

1,153,789
1,496,157
3,195,660

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the emigration
from Europe was primarily to the United States. The countries of Europe
felt a need to provide their own colonies to which their nations' offspring could go and flourish.
reap a double benefit:

In doing so, the mother country would

on the one hand she would lessen the pressure of

a rapidly growing population, and on the other, she would enhance her
trading potential.5
At a more visceral level, perhaps imperialism and colonialism
were simply the result of atavism, a thesis offered by Professor
Shumpeter.

Perhaps nations fa 11 owed 11

aggression for the sake of

aggressions, ••. domination for the sake of domination • • • 116
The motives for imperialism and the acquisition of colonies were
diverse and complex.

However diverse and complex the motives, imperial-

ism and colonialism were operative devices of the European powers through
the waning years of the nineteenth century into the twentieth.
The statesmen of France viewed the question of whether or not to
colonize as rhetorical, and categorically stated that the survival of
France depended upon the acquisition of colonies.

In response to this

territorial imperative, France added five million square miles to her
holdings.

Italy, in spite of grievous setbacks, followed the urgings of

nationalists to fulfill Italy's sacred duty to her Roman heritage and

5

earned almost a million square miles. The English, not shirking the
"white man's burden", added four million square miles to her empire plus
protectorates and spheres of influence.

Germany, long held in check by

the Iron Chancellor, while entering late into the rush for colonies
was still able to build an empire of a million square miles in Africa
and the East Indies, as well as to become the dominant force in the
Asiatic portion of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, by way of contrast, had no aspirations in North Africa, but had vital interests in
the Ottoman states in the Balkans. The sick man of Europe
11

11

,

the

Ottoman Empire, relied upon the divergent interest and aspirations of
the Powers to maintain her territorial integrity)
Based on these generalized imperial and colonial aspirations,
the f o11 owing pages deal with a more specific review of the interests
of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean and North Africa.

CHAPTER II
INTERESTS OF THE POWERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH AFRICA
Great Britain, the traditional sea power of Europe, had accumulated extensive colonial holdings by the middle of the nineteenth century. Her industrial dominance in the world was secured by her naval
power and the industrial immaturity of other states; Germany and Italy
had yet to be unified.

With this pre-eminent position, colonial desires

were relegated to second place as Englishmen wanted not to rule, but to
trade.

In this scheme of things there was no place for empire or ex-

pansion. British statesmen held that the imperial additions of New
Zealand, Natal, Transvaal, Basutoland and the Fiji Islands in the period
from 1840 to 1874 would not bring commensurate returns for the cost and
effort of caring for them. The consensus was, except for a small group,
that further expansion should be only through commercial endeavors.l
The British position had been, and was dedicated, to safeguarding and monopolizing the land and sea routes to India. The method was
threefold:

(1) occupying strategic places on islands or the mainland

/-for coaling stations or naval basesJ that dominated the route /-e.g.
Gibraltar, Egypt, CyprusJ; (2) achieving economic or political control
of the countries around India to preclude other European powers from
land or water access to India, and the corollary to this; (3) frustrating the efforts of other European powers to establish themselves
economically or politically in the countries around India or on the water
6
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routes to India. 2 Beyond this Indian policy, the English were opposed
to the extension of the Empire and, in fact, favored a program of freeing the colonies, letting them adopt self-government, and following her
pursuit of free trade.
With these conditions operative, why did England embark upon a
course of new imperialism? The answer lies in the condition of the continental nations of Europe.

By 1871, Germany and Italy had completed

the process of unification. The nations on the continent had matured.
They had acquired the ability to produce trade goods on a large scale.
They had turned to industrial development based on closed trade in
favor of their former involvement in expensive continental wars. By
1885, France was able to send large amounts of capital abroad and Germany had made significant inroads into traditionally British trading
areas.

In the decade from 1880 to 1890 Germany inserted herself into

the Ottoman Empire, and while gaining economic dominance usurped from
Great Britain the role of champion of the Turks.

Following the lead of

French economists and statesmen, Germany reluctantly came to the conclusion that to be safe she, too, must have colonies.
The completion of the Suez Canal by the French in 1869 opened
a new trade route to India. This threat to the India trade was met in
1875 by the English purchase of the controlling shares of stock in the
canal from the Egyptian Khedive for t4,000,000.

The new trade route

through Egypt and the Red Sea suddenly increased the importance of the
Near East in British Imperial Policy.

8

The rush, then, of French and German industrial concerns into
the spheres of previous British dominance forced Great Britain along the
imperial path. As the traders of the world, the English obviously would
have preferred their world as it had been - a world of open markets
served almost exclusively by British tradesmen.

However, with the

French and Germans claiming large areas of the world for their preserves,
the restriction of British outlets was a foregone conclusion.

For this

reason, the British fe1t compelled to expand the Empire, to pre-empt
large areas to preclude the chance of their being closed to them by
exclusive rivals. To have economic control, it was felt that one must
first have political control.3 Following this line of thought, the
British from

1878

onward sought to positively control the routes to

India, instead of negatively trying to forbid the inroads of others.4
An exception to this policy, or more specifically, a return to the negative policy, was the Mediterranean Agreement of Great Britain, Italy and
Austria-Hungary in 1887.5
The increased attention of Britain to the Near East led to a
de facto protectorate over Egypt in 1882.

In response to internal re-

volt in Egypt, Britain had sought the aid of France and Italy in putting
down an insurrection against the Khedive in which Europeans had been
killed in Alexandria. Aid was not forthcoming and Britain alone put
down the insurgents. The British action which resulted in military
occupation firmly ensconced Great Britain in Egypt and opened the door
to additional conquests. The instability of Egyptian political rule and

9

the rise of the Mahdi eventually resulted in the consolidation of the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan by 1899 - after the fateful encounter of the
French and British at Fashoda.
The clash at Fashoda resulted directly from one of the keystones
of British policy in Africa - protection of the Upper Nile.

Egypt's

twelve thousand square miles of fertile land on the banks and delta of
the Lower Nile could easily be turned into a desert like the surrounding 390,000 square miles of the country, without the water from the
Upper Nile. Whoever controlled the Upper Nile controlled Egypt. Egypt
was Britain's most highly prized and most important possession in Africa.6
The interests of France, Germany and Italy, while of a similar
stripe to that of England, came to fruition later because of divisive
internal factors.
France, between 1815 and 1870, through the largely accidental
policies of glory-and-popularity-seeking officials, more than doubled
her colonial holdings.

The debilities left by the Franco-Prussian War

stopped her unconscious acquisition of colonies for more than a decade.
An illustrative case of the unconscious acquisition policy of
France is that of Algeria.

Early in the nineteenth century, the Euro-

pean states had forced the rulers of Algeria, Tunis and Tripoli to
respect their flags and protect their citizens.

France, on December 25,

1801, extracted the promise from the Dey of Algiers to respect French
persons and property in Algeria.

By 1827, relations between France and

Algeria had deteriorated to the point where the French felt it necessary
to impose a naval blockade on the Algerian capital. The three-year

10
blockade was unsuccessful.

To avenge the broken promise, the French

Government finally sent a force of 40,000 men to capture the capital,
Algiers. This was done on July 4, 1830. The Dey was deposed and his
lands taken by force of arms. No serious attempt was made to conciliate
the chosen leaders of the people, or to win the confidence of the people,
for that matter.
France, for a broken promise, had started the movement for the
reoccupation of North Africa by Europe.

Her first North African posses-

sion was a military colony that cost her dearly - 150,000 lives and
$600,000,000.
By the time France secured Tunis in 1881, she had developed an
effective colonial policy.

In 1830, a treaty for the recognition of

French nationals and a favorable commercial agreement had been drawn
with the Bey of Tunis.

French policy had fluctuated through the next

six decades because of the pacificatiun of Algeria and the war with
Prussia and its aftennath.
In 1881, border difficulties between Algeria and Tunisia opened
the door to French military intervention which 1ed to the Convention of
Marsa in 1883, and the conversion of the dominions of the Bey of Tunis
into a French protectorate. The security of the French position in
Algeria was guaranteed by the acquisition of Tunisia. 7 With these countries in her control, France turned her attention in North Africa to
Morocco.

Upon this issue the interests of the other powers in question

were brought to bear and will be pursued below.

11

The general imperial-colonial aspiration of Germany arose from
the settlement of internal questions before 1870. As a direct result
of that settlement, she rose to the stature of the predominant continental power in a short span of time. Germany, by the middle of the 1880 s,
1

with war reparations and industrial loans from France, was becoming an
industrial as well as a military power. To support her industrial
growth, she adopted the continental policy of protective tariffs instead
of the British concept of free trade. Thriving under this system, German goods penetrated unprotected England, as well as English colonies
and the traditional English trading grounds. This economic penetration
was an underlying element in future English-German antagonisms.a
German colonial interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa,
per se, were limited, as will be seen below in her intrusion into the
Moroccan sphere in 1905 and after.
The unification of Italy, started in 1861 and completed only in
1871 with the addition of the Papal States, was fraught with discord - a

discord that lingered long after unification was said to be completed.
In the midst of internal strife, /The Reds and Blacks, the Southern
Question, the Papal Question, and so on7, Italy endeavored to play the
role of "Great Power", a role for which she was not qualified. 0riani
in Fino! Dogali in 1889

11 • • •

proclaimed Italy's inevitable mission -

the raison d'etre of the Risorgimento to be the return to Africa. The resurgence of Italy was part of a great historical design in which the
nation and its people were to play a part. This mission was the
civilizing of the Dark Continent. 119

12

The Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896 is notorious.

As a legacy

of infamy in Italy, it served to kindle Italian interest in North
Africa. Tunisia was a logical home for Italian expansion, but had been
snatched from her field by the French in 1881. Having lost militarily
and diplomatically in other areas in Africa, Italian attention turned
to Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
In.1882, Germany and Austria-Hungary presented to Italy a marvelous opportunity.

They asked her to join them in a defensive team in

the name of peace and maintenance of the status quo in Europe and the
Balkans.

Italy, small and weak as she was, was more than willing to

say she would not attack Germany or Austria-Hungary in the event that
they, respectively, might be attacked by France and Russia.

In return

for her promise, Italy initially was given assurances of protection
against the French, the sneak-thieves who had stolen Tunisia.

From

these inauspicious beginnings, Italy, by playing the ends against the
middle, by flirting with the English and the French, turned her participation in the Triple Alliance into a club.

With this club, she wrenched

from the signators of the Triple Alliance additional concessions.

In

terms of her African interest, the most significant of these-were recognition of her colonial plans in North Africa, commercial and poli.tica.1
opportunities and the de facto status as a Great Power.

Additional

benefits were realized in the opportunity to consolidate her domestic
position without the fear of intervention, to restore her financial
position and to embark upon a program to strengthen her army and navy.

13

Comparing the articles under the original Treaty of the Triple
Alliance with those under the Fourth Treaty of 1902 will show the
ground gained by her in the space of twenty years. What began as an
instrument for a purely defensive alliance, Italy turned into a document of aggression to justify her occupation of Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica.
The skein of alliances vacillated in the two decades following
the drawing of the Triple Alliance.

Countries in pursuit of national

interests sought advantage through a change in the balance of power.
At the political demise of Otto von Bismarck, who had preserved
the peace of Europe for some twenty years, Wi 11 i am II began his harrowing course through the diplomatic circles of Europe undoing much of what
Bismarck had accomplished.
In hope of an agreement with England, William declined in 1890
to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. This, in conjunction with
the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891, sent Russia looking for a
new ally to re-establish the balance. She settled on France, and by
1894 they had concluded a military pact to back up letters of intent to
11

maintain the peace negotiated in 1891.
11

As England and France were still at odds over Egypt and Fashoda
and English and Russian interests clashed in the Far East, in 1901
Russia and France entered into a military agreement against the chance
that either might go to war with England.
Diplomacy in the nineteenth century was based on a balance of
alliances. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 had established the pacific
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bases for most of the century. As seen above, England was best able to
reap the advantages of this as France inherited the Napoleonic aftermath of the Third Republic while Germany and Italy were in the throes
of unification.
By 1900, the positions of the Powers in the Mediterranean and
North Africa had resolved themselves to British control of Egypt, the
Suez and routes to India; French consolidation in Algeria and Tunisia
with aspirations for the inclusion of Morocco; a lack of overt interest
by Germany; and to Italy's "peaceful penetration" of Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica upon which she had designs.
The diplomatic roots for these positions are found in the Treaty
of Berlin of 1878.

From this document, which contemplated the partition

of Turkey, a new wave of colonial expansion into North Africa was
generated.

From 1878 forward, the Ottoman territories were more and

more subjected to the ravages of European states.
At Berlin, British control of Cyprus was traded for disinterest
in French expansion into Tunisia.

Italy, like France, left the Congress

with "clean hands", but not with the happy feeling of the French.
The Balkan irredenta had been rekindled 11 ••• and the sour dissatisfaction of the Italians at always being ignored, which has since
become almost an obsession with them (not wholly unjustified) are
definitely traceable to the Berlin Congress. 1110 This question of inferior status and her need for 11 a place in the sun" was one with which
the Powers would in the near future have to deal.

15

More immediate was the conf1ict between France and England at
Fashoda in 1898. These two Powers met at odds over French expansion in
Central Africa which threatened British control of Egypt by interdiction
in the Upper Nile.

England had been in control of Egypt since 1882.

France had resented this control because of her commercial efforts in
Egypt and her Suez project, which had both been snatched away by the
Briti$h.
The French had dreams of a corridor across Africa from the
Atlantic to the Red Sea.

An opening through which this dream might be

fulfilled was seen by the French to exist between the northernmost
limits of the British claims and the southernmost limits of the Egyptian
claims.

In that opening was the town of Fashoda.

Effectually, the

controller of Fashoda was the controller of the Ni le.

In that, the

French saw the possibility to extort from the British what they wanted.
Marchand for the French and Kitchener for the English raced for
Fashoda. The story is well known. Marchand stole the march and raised
the French flag over Fashoda. Having gained the prize, France found
herself faced with the options of war with England or retreat. She
chose the easiest, most sensible course, that of retreat from which
mutual benefits for both countries were derived. 11

The upshot of the

Fashoda affair was French recognition of England in Egypt and English
recognition of French ambitions in Morocco.
This agreement laid the basis for the reconciliation of France
and Britain. The ensuing Anglo-French Entente, signed on April 8, 1904,
paved the way for French predominance in Morocco while guaranteeing

16

English dominance in Egypt. This coalescence of French and English
interests opened the door to the assertion of the rights of Germany as
a world power - because she had not been consulted.
Sultan Muley Hassan had through a vigorous policy been able to
resist the inroads of foreigners into Morocco.

Upon his death in 1894,

the politfcal situation in Morocco rapidly deteriorated.

France~ fear-

ing inroads by other governments into her special sphere /Which might
loose the Algerian Pandora's box of insurrectio,!ll made strides toward
obtaining recognition of her special interests in Morocco.

In 1900,

France and Italy exchanged letters concerning Morocco and Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica. The letter from Visconti-Venosta to Barrere
' dated December 16, 1900, reads in part:
~ •. if a modification of the political or territorial status
of Morocco should result therefrom, Italy would reserve to herself,
as a measure of reciprocity, the right eventually to develop her
influence with regard to Tripolitania-Cyrenaica.12

Following this agreement with the third member of the Triple
Alliance, France turned toward Spain which also was by virtue of
geography interested in Morocco. These overtures came to naught as
Spain didn't want to move without the approval of England. The English,
after a series of exchanges between governments beginning in 1903,
became more tractable because of the imminent threat of the RussoJapanese War and in early April 1904, the Anglo-French Entente was
assured. Of the issues considered, the third was the prize for each
country; they exchanged approval of relative positions and spheres of
influence:

Britain in Egypt, France in Morocco.

By October of 1904, a

Franco-Spanish agreement had accorded a sphere of influence to Spain.

17

The Powers most vitally interested had decided the fate and
future of Morocco without considering the feelings of Germany. Germany
had not even been consulted in the tentative division of interest in
Morocco.

Even though she had no significant interest in that area,

the fact that the other powers had deigned act without her resulted in
Germany launching a precipitous, pre-emptive protest. 13 The Kaiser
appeared at Tangier and expounded on Germany's economic interests in
Morocco.

In reality, the stance of the Kaiser was an attempt to break

the Angla-French Entente.
or indeed for the world.

"There was no Moroccan question for Germany,
It was necessary therefore to create one. 111 4

On the one hand, there was a possibility of war if France refused to
negotiate with the Germans; on the other, certain humiliation in the
eyes of the world if she did. Theophile Oelcasse', the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs inferred a great deal of support for resistance from
the British and urged a strong policy against Germany.
were not as convinced.

His associates

Delcasse'resigned on June 6, 1905, a victim of

the German thrust to divide the Entente. With the resignation of
Delcasse, two diplomatic triumphs accrued to Germany:

the resignation

itself and the calling of a conference to review the Moroccan question.
Germany could hardly have expected to gain more than this at the conference
because she fully realized that the Great Powers were arranged against
her. 15
At the Algeciras Conference, in the important question of police
control of the Algerian border, the precarious diplomatic position of
Germany in the world of European states was clearly drawn in The

18
Observer:

"Italy has also failed to adopt the German position, so that

the convener of the conference now finds himself in a position of a
minority of one. 11 16
Germany had failed in her attempt to break the Entente.

In

reality, she had strengthened it by forcing England and France closer
together.

She had, however, thrust her way into the French sphere and

as a result of Algeciras could again legitimately broach the Moroccan
question as her need for it might ari$e.
Another Power was thrust into the European sphere as a result
of the conference at Algeciras.

That Power, new on the international

scene, was the United States of America, under the leadership of
Theodore Roosevelt.
At the invitation of Germany for "moral support" for the maintenance of the status quo in Morocco,17 the incursion of American
political influence in European affairs was furthered.

Roosevelt's

response to Germany's request that he speak with the English favoring
an international conference on Morocco was initially lukewarm. The request was made on April 13, 1905.

From his hunting camp in East Divide

Creek, Colorado, Roosevelt on April 20 wrote of his feeling to William
H. Taft, acting Secretary of State:
I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the
Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real
interest in Morocco •••• 18
The opportunity to exert the new-found American Power on the
international scene was one, however, that Roosevelt could not resist.
In

11
~

••

the interest of trying to keep matters on an even keel in

19
Europe~ ••• 11 19 Roosevelt conceded to intervene in Paris and London on
behalf of Germany's desire for the conference at Algeciras. The results
of the conference are indicated above. The role of the Unfted States as
the new world Power was enhanced.

In 1905, United States interest in

the Mediterranean, however, was vigorously denied.
Actually, the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean,
though often vacillating in intensity, were long standing. As a colonial
extension of Great Britain, merchants from the New World plied their
trade in the Old.

In recounting the background of the war with the

Barbary pritates from 1801-1816, Ernest Dupuy and William Baumer offer
the following resume of the prosperity of early American commercial endeavors in the Mediterranean:
•.• The Mediterranean basin actually absorbing one-quarter of
the colonial export of dried and pickled fish and one-sixth of its
flour, wheat, and rice. Rum, lumber, beeswax, and onions were other
fairly important American exports . • . • by 1790 nearly one hundred
American merchantmen annually called at Mediterranean ports.20
In 1799, the approximate value of goods shipped to Spain and
Italy in American vessels was $8,800,000, by the following year it had
increased to approximately $11,000,000.
Cargoes of such value whetted the appetites of the Barbary corsairs who had traditionally been paid tribute by various trading nations
in the Mediterranean to give their ships unmolested passage.
The Pasha of Tripoli, for example, in October, 1800, demanded
of the United States a new treaty that called for increased tribute in
dollars and kind /as in the past:
and even cruiserg.21

gunpowder, fieldpieces, small arms,

20
United States refusal of this demand resulted in a declaration
of war by Tripoli against the United States.
By July 1, 1801, the American fleet /of three frigates and a
schooner./ had reached Gibraltar. This was the inauspicious beginning
of American naval presence in the Mediterranean, a presence that was
maintained at various levels through the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912.
The United States paid in total about $2,000,000 in tribute to
the Barbary Pirates, enough money to have built an imposing fleet that
was urged in 1796 by Minister to France, Thomas Jefferson. The purpose
of such a fleet would be to

11

•••

arm the President with the safest of

a11 instruments of coercion. 22
11

The coercive nature of American Naval power in the Mediterranean
was slow to develop. Through years of frustration, ineptitude, brave
exploits, and marginal success, U. S. Naval personnel suffered until the
eventual defeat of the Barbary Pirates in the 11 Tripolitan War 11 of
1801-1816.
Through this episode, however, the influence of the United
States in the Mediterranean was guaranteed.

Having good ships and having

stayed out of European wars,, the Americans gained outstanding advantage
as neutral carriers. The Americans followed the example of the free
trade policy of the n~w imperialism and profited greatly from it ..
His tori ca lly, in the .opening of a new area, traders fo 11 ow
missionaries and are in turn followed by the military.

This pattern

was also followed in the emergence of the United States as a Power in
the Mediterranean.

William Eaton, counsul-designate in Tunis, at the
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direction of Secretary of State Pickering, proclaimed to the inhabitants
of Tripoli that extension of their commerce would be more beneficial to
their self-interest than raiding the commerce of Christians.2 3
Given this pedagogical content, the campaign in the Mediterranean
can be looked upon as a first missionary effort in the spreading
the principles of the new American Pf.ra. Nor was it to be the last
such effort: for much of the nineteenth century, Americans would
work to open the world to the beneficient influence of commerce.24
If this seems like a secular perversion of the religious mission,
the perversion was soon rectified.

In 1824, the wives of Protestant

missionaries Isaac Bird and William Goodell started a school with an enrollment of six Arab children. With fifty students at year's end, the
average attendance within two years was three hundred and by the end of
the next year had again doubled.
Between August of 1822 and 1827, 55,000 copies of 43 publications of Seri ptures and tracts

La total of l, 700,000 page27' were printed

in Italian and Greek to meet the assumed taste of the Levantine peoples
for 11 reading and reflection. 11 Nearly 5,000,000 pages /78,000 copies/
of fourteen works for elementary schools, written in modern Greek, were
printed in 1831; 27,000 copies of a single primer, Alphabetarion were run.
By 1900, from embryonic beginnings, the missionaries from
America had a network of American colleges covering the Levant.

11 The

Americans had set out across the world to teach the word of God; quite
without intention, as T. E. Lawrence was to observe, they taught revolution.1125
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Through preaching and teaching /be it God's word or revolutioDJ
the Americans brought to the Mediterranean their interest in commerce
and the weight of their naval influence.
From the sale of Smyrna raisins in Boston in 1785 26 through the
rise of missionary activity inferred above, the United States Navy grew
apace watching over the endeavors of American nationals throughout the
worl.d .. even though interrupted at times by domestic anti-navy forces.
The ebb and flow of interest in the area of the Mediterranean
caused the Secretary of the Navy to report in 1838 that the original
reasons for having part of the American navy in the Mediterranean
11

•

~

•

have in great measure ceased. 11 His orders to squadron commanders

enjoined:
••• active cru1s1ng, the assertion of America's just rights
and the avoidance of encroachment upon the rights of others, the
preservation of friendly relations with all, and the procurement,
as opportunity afforded, of new plants and seeds to aid the agricultural interests of the country.
Aside from the last injunction, these orders became the keynote to
American policy in the Mediterranean:

the stance of watchful waiti_ng.

The Secretary, in his report, continued:
••• as a means of exhibiting a portion of our naval forces in
contact and in comparison with that of the principle maritime states
of Europe, and for the purpose of affording countenance and protection to our commerce a perseverance in this policy will equal~ contribute to the good of the service and the honor of the u. s.
President Washington's urging in 1796 of a permanent protecting
force for America's Mediterranean commerce gained reality in 1815.

Five

ships under the conmand of Commodore John Shaw were stationed in the
Mediterranean in the aftermath of the war with the Barbary Pirates.2 8
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In 1838 the Mediterranean policy of the U.S. was enunciated by the
Secretary of the Navy.
Missionaries had called for a show of the fleet in Beirut in
1828. The call went unanswered.

By 1903, however,

••. it was out of the question for us not to send our squadron
to Beirut, and out of the question for us to withdraw it afterwards, unless we are given the satisfaction that should be given.29
The Americal'.l posture had changed.

Riding on the wave of Captain

Alfred Thayer Mahan's thesis of mercantile navies and command, rather
than freedom of the seas, the American nation looked outward through the
Mediterranean to the Orient.
However Europeanized, however overshadowed by new Asiatic ventures, Mediterranean history did not stop. An American commerce
continued with the Levant, and an American squadron still cruised
the inland sea. The Near Eastern missionary establishment remained
active, and the educational institutions . • . continued to prosper.30
An affirmation of the U. S. position is illustrated in the episode of Joseph Tobia Levy, an American citizen in Tangiers seeking
damages against the Moorish Government.

On May 2, 1899, John Hay wrote

to the Secretary of the Navy in his behalf.

Ignoring commercial and
missionary interests of the United States he said, 11 What is desired is
not direct action but the moral influence arising from the visit of a
war vessel •.• 113 1
This was the underlying motive for sending the American Mediterranean squadron to Beirut in 1903 and warships to Tangiers to encourage
the return of the American Perdicaris by the bandit Raisuli in 1904.
Thus, 11 ••• the ancient triad of American activities - commerce,
missions, and Navy- •.• 1132 were the cornerstones of American interests
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in the Mediterranean. At Algeciras, Roosevelt who was to say in 1908,
11

_ • that we have interests in the whole world. .

is world politics . . . ,33 showed to the whole world

American politics
11
•••

how closely

American interests were becoming linked with those of Great Britain and
France. 1134
France gained a 11 signal diplomatic triumph 11 at Algeciras;
Germany

11
•••

ensconced herself in Morocco for good or evil with a view

to controlling the policy of France. 35 Further confrontation between
11

the Powers was not far away.
The next flare in international relations came in 1908 with
Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Administrative rights
to these Turkish provinces had been accorded Austria in the Treaty of
Berlin in 1878. With the Young Turk revolution of July and a promise
of constitutional government for Turkey, Austria feared that Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina would insist in sending representatives to the
Turkish Parliament. She also feared that Turkey, infused with a new
nationalistic spirit, would demand a return of these provinces to
Turkish control. The obvious solution to the problem was simply to
annex the provinces and weather the storm that was sure to break.

It

did. The ensuing diplomatic crisis lasted for some six months. The
Austrian policies of Aehrenthal triumphed over those of the Russian
Isvolsky who had hoped to capture for Russia the Straits in return for
assistance to Austria in her couR.
Russia, still weak from the Russo-Japanese War absorbed diplomatic humiliation at the hands of Austria backed by Germany.

From this
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debacle, the Triple Entente was formed to balance power in the Balkans.
The changing balance of power in the Balkans caused traditionally
irredentist Italy to move away from Austria and the Triple Alliance and
to enter into a "status quo in the Balkans 11 agreement with Russia. The
Treaty of Racconigi of October 24, 1909, with Russia, traded Balkan
status quo for recognition of Italian aims in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
Concurrent with the rise and culmination of the Bosnian Crisis,
Germany and France had arrived at economic agreements in regard to
Morocco.

Chancellor van Bulow on April 5, 1906, had emphasized

11
•••

that Gennany had no political interests in Morocco, no political aspirations, and no desire to set foot on Moroccan soil • • . . 113 6 The Sultan
had been forced from his capital and anarchy reigned in Morocco. The
French, in the role of policemen, intensified their penetration of the
country.

"Peaceful penetration" turned to military intervention. After

a period of quasi-calm, the anarchy of the Sheerfian state erupted again
in 1911, which resulted in the sending of a French military mission to
Fez. Gennany, seeing an opportunity to gain influence in the area, sent
the gunboat "Panther" to Agadi r on July l, 1911, os tens ib ly to protect
Gennan subjects and prottg{s, as well as her economic interests. 37
The nature of Gennany's intentions was hard to ascertain. The
Observer in this period of crisis in early July ran reports showing the
range of possible German interests:

The full occupation of Agadir; the

division of Morocco to include a German sphere of interest; a naval
base flanking Gibraltar Lwhich would erode the foundation of English
foreign polic£; or compensation.

Compensation anywhere, but compensation.
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"Whatever she can get. 11 ; this response of an ex-Teuton diplomatist
to the question, 11 What does Germany want? 11 , was probably very close to
the truth.38 The most Germany could hope for was breakdown of the
Anglo-French Entente. The least she could expect was compensation.
These alternatives were sought at the risk of war.
Again, as in the Moroccan crisis of 1905, world opinion was
against Germany.

Instead of forcing a rift between England and France,

the two countries were forged together in common accord. The aroused
state of English opinion is seen in the words of Mr. Lloyd George at
the Bankers' dinner at Mansion House where he said that if England
11 • • •

were to be treated where her interests were vi tally affected as

if she were of no account ••• peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. 1139
Germany and Morocco had not been mentioned, however the position
of England had been succinctly put forth.

With British assurance, France

threw off her fear of the rattling of the German saber and demanded
from Germany the right to complete her dream of a consolidated empire
in North Africa without the shackles of German interference. 40 In the
anticlimax of British reassurance of France, Germany, realizing her
bluff had been called, still maintained a facade of hardness and twice
before agreement was reached there were rumors of war.

Financial panic

in Germany encouraged her to with draw with what gains she coul. d. On
November 4, 1911, a new France-German agreement was signed:

Germany,

by cession, received part of the French Congo; France was given clear
title to the protectorate in Morocco.

With the rebuff of Germany,
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division of the spoils of North Africa was complete - with one exception.
England had fulfilled her desires to maintain her Mediterranean dominance
and routes to India /including Egypt and Suez/, as well as nullify the
threat to Gibraltar from the North African coast; France had solidified
the hold on her conglomerate interests in North Africa:

Algeria, Tunisia

and Morocco. The exception, of course, was the fulfillment of Italy's
desires to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
Italy, in the total scheme of things, was not very important.
To her, however, the issues at stake were deemed vital.
country with great aspirations.

She was a small

Because of her size and relative lack

of power, she could only play a secondary role in the spoliation of the
Ottoman Empire.

Her power was found in a "tipping of the scales" re-

lationship with the Great Powers. That was her forte.

John Thayer

characterizes this forte very well when he says, "Realpolitik for Italy
meant not the show of power, but the more traditional Piedmontese policy
of carefully assessing and if possible exploiting the power of others. 1141
Realpolitik for Italy in September of 1911 saw the solution of
the Moroccan question at hand and realized the opportunity to occupy
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica must be seized - or lost.
had been carefully paved.

The road to Tripoli

In the face of Young Turk nationalism and the

fear of German competition, the Italians issued their ultimatum to
Turkey on September 28, 1911. With signed agreements from France,
Austria and Russia and the tacit agreement of England, Italy moved to
fill the void between the possessions of England and France on the
North African coast.
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In one fell swoop, reminiscent of Austria in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Italy abrogated the long-standing agreements regarding the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Dogali and Adowa were to be revenged.

Italy had made the leap to find her 11 place in the sun 11 of North Africa.

CHAPTER I II
THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TRIPOLITAN WAR, 1911-1912
As the nineteenth century closed, Italy found herself a loser
in the imperialistic race for colonial possessions.

Germany, Belgium,

the United States and Japan, though late comers in the race, had
managed to garner certain holdings outside their territorial borders.
Britain had acquired her empire upon which "the sun never set", which
included Egypt.

France, the loser of a colonial empire in the eight-

eenth century, had recouped her losses, and Algeria and Tunisia were
included in her new empire.

Italy s imperial domain encompassed Eritrea
1

and Somaliland, and included frustration.

Tunisia, Abyssinia and

Tripoli had been tacitly promised to Italy by the Great Powers in diplomatic intrigues of the past decades.

Italy was frustrated by France s

acquisition of Tunisia under General Boulanger in 1881.

1

Italy was hu-

miliated and frustrated by the Abyssinians in Adowa in 1896. To the
Italians at the turn of the century, Tripoli remained as the only possibility for rectification; for imperial prestige in the near after-math
of an imperial era.
Latent for a generation, Italy 1 s desire in North Africa was
awakened in the first decade of the twentieth century.
An expedition to Tripoli had seemed imminent as early as 1902,
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prinetti, was perhaps not
unwilling to embark upon it, but he eventually chose the alternative path of •economic penetration•, in order to prepare for
territorial occupation at whatever time and in whatever manner
should seem best.l
29
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Economic penetration of Tripoli generated friction between Turk
and Italian.

Friction turned into alienation.

Alienation between Turk

and Italian was heightened by the shelling of Medi by the Italian gunboat 11 Arethura 11 in November, 1910.

Italian nationals, caught by the

Turks dealing in war contraband had been seized and incarcerated. Under
the duress of bombardment, the Ottoman Mutessarrif, previously intransigent, backed down and freed the Italians. 2 The coals of war had been
stirred ..
Italian notes of aggressive intent relative to Tripoli were
sent to Vienna and Berlin in December, 1910. The level of alienation
between Turkish and Italian authorities in Tripoli was raised further
by the South American anti-Italian propaganda incident of January, 1911. 3
I ta 1i an public opinion in Italy was becoming inflamed against
the treatment of Italian nationals in Tripoli.

A nationalistic-

imperialistic line was followed by the press as is represented in an
article in L'Idea Nazionale, dated March 1, 1911:
The Tripoli question exists today •.• There is only one solution after the disasterous experience of a conciliatory policy
toward the Porte ••. Either the cessation of hostilities and the
ample recognition of our rights in Tripolitania, or territorial
occupation. There is no other way.4
In July, under the auspices of the Italian government led by
Giovanni Giolitti, the eventuality of an 11 honorable 11 solution of the
Tripoli question was relayed to European governments; the probability
of an imminent military solution in Tripoli was communicated. Tacit
agreement of the Powers to the intentions of Italy continued, with the
proviso that a European conflagration not be ignited.
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The Italian iron, long heated, was now hot,
••. and it is no wonder that, seeing the partition of the continent about to be completed by the French occupation of Morocco,
Italy should conclude that .her last chance had come and should
determine to take advantage of it with or without plausible excuse.5
On September 28, 1911, the ultimatun of the Italian Government
over the signature of Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, was handed to the Government of the Porte in Constantinople.

Couched in diplomatic terms, citing the grievances of Italy in

Tripoli, the ultimatum was little more than an elaboration of the statement of L'Idea Nazionale of March l - but now the alternative of reform
had, in reality, been removed. Her sovereignty challenged in Tripoli,
'

'

the Imperial Turkish Government could be conciliatory, but could not
accede to the blatant demands of the Royal Italian Government.
At the conclusion of the twenty-four hour period given the Porte
to consider the ultimatum, a satisfactory answer was not forthcoming.
The causus belli had been established. On September 29, 1911, Italy
declared war on the Turkish Empire. The scene of war initially was to
be Tripoli and Cyrenaica, collectively called Tripolitania or the
Tripolitain.
The military posture of the Turks and Italians at the point of
diplomatic impasse is one of curious contrast. The Turkish Army had
just gone through a complete organization and refurbishment and had been
successfully tested against Kurdish tribes in the Syrian hinterland;
Ottoman naval resurgence had begun.
11
•

_

•

But at the declaration of war

a large part of the Tripoli division of the Ottoman army is still
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far away in Yemen. The Turkish fleet was scattered, and, in any case
too weak and unprepared to resist the Italian squadrons. 6
11

A more specific appraisal was written by Kepi, 7 in Blackwood's
Magazine, as follows:
Although the Tripoli garrison had been neglected by Stambul,
it must not be thought that it was in the decayed state that one
connects with the Turkish army of a few years back. The supply of
quick firing field and mountain artillery (Krupp 1908) was up to
establishment. The men throughout the division were equipped with
khaki uniforms and the new kalpak and bachlik. There was an adequate
supply of small-arm ammunition, and . . . also a fine supply of reserve magazine rifles. What Tripoli lacked was land defenses; the
semi-circle of forts that defended the harbor were of ancient construction, and were furnished with an obsolete model of Krupp
fortress artillery. Moreover, there were no trained fortress gunners
to man the batteries and to get from them the best of their puny
powers. At a liberal computation the most that Neshet Bey, the chief
military commander, could count upon in the whole vilayet of Tripoli
could not have exceeded 10,000 men. 8
Comparative statistics published in 1921 show:
••• that according to the estimate of General Bucaris, at the end
of 1910 ••• the potenti~l strength of the Italian army on a war
basis was . . • a total Lstanding army of 725,000, adding •••
milizia mobile and milizia Territoriale, the General total •••
1,393,000. Compared with the 200,000 men at the disposal of Italy
in 1861 and to 600,000 potentially at her disposal in 1870, this was
a remarkable total.9
The Italian General Staff calculated that two divisions would
be sufficient for the occupation of the Tripolitan coast towns.
It was argued that if Italy could put a division on shore at Tripoli,
a brigade at Benghazi, and split up another brigade amongst other
coast ports, that Turkey, with her fleet destroyed, would have no
choice but to accept the inT~itable and sur,render her claims in
North Africa at discretion.
Here, in capsule form, is Italy's battle plan and army attack
strength. She also

11
•••

entered the campaign with a battleship squa-

dron of two divisions, ·and a cruiser squadron of similar strength, only
that one division was a ship short. 1111
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With this preponderance of naval power Italy had planned to
sweep the Turkish fleet from the Mediterranean at the moment of expiration of the ultimatum.

In this she failed.

The Turkish vessels, unaware

of the Italian declaration of war, and the fact that they were being
pursued by the Italian fleet, sailed blithley into the Dardanelles to
safety.
The army and navy of Italy were ready for war.

Turkey, in

Tripoli, was not.
Having not taken the Italian's warnings seriously until the
beginning of October, Turkey had only time to send arms and ammunition
to Tripoli, in lieu of an armed force.

The steamship Derna was chart-

ered for this purpose and subsequently chaperoned to Tripoli by an
Italian cruiser.

Arriving on September 26, 1911, the 10,000 plus weapons in her hold were unloaded - and were soon to be given to the 11 peaceful11 Arabs who inhabited the vilayet of Tripoli •
. The Italian fleet composed of four battleships, three cruisers,
six destroyers and five torpedo boats first appeared off Tripoli on
September 28, 1911.

Immediately prior to this date, a portion of the

fleet had sunk two Turkish torpedo boats at Prevasa in the Adriatic,
had captured an electric launch in the Red Sea and had blockaded the
Tripolitan coast.
At 10 a.m. on September 29, the day on which Italy declared war
against the Turkish Empire, an Italian torpedo boat under a white flag
put in at Tripoli and demanded the surrender of the city.
was denied.

The demand
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On October 1, an Italian torpedo boat under a white flag put
in at Tripoli. The Turks were given the option of putting the Derna to
sea and having it captured or scuttling the vessel.

The Derna was

scuttled.
On October 2 and 3, the Italians again, under a white flag of
truce demanded the surrender of Tripoli. 12
During this period of Italian demanding without offensive action,
the Turks in Tripoli were busily engaged preparing their defenses.
Between September 29 and October 3, the Turks, under Neshet Bey,
armed the local Arabs with the weapons from the Derna, secured provisions enough for three months and withdrew from Tripoli into the desert.
They left in Tripoli only enough soldiers to man the fort guns to make
token defense of the city in the face of the Italian might •. At 2:30 a.m.
on October 1, the Turks were cut off from the Porte.

At a point two

miles off-shore, the Italians had cut the East Telegraph cable. From
September 29, to October 3:

Quiet ••• the lull before the storm.

And

then, in the words of John Q. Wood, the American Consul in Tripoli from
1910-1913:
Bombardment commenced Oct. 3, 3 P.M. continued at intervals
three days, City, Arabs surrendered Oct. 5, 4 P.M. as Turkish
authority ceased to exist. Italian marines landed, hoisted flag
over Castle Oct. 5, 5 P.M. Much looting during the time bombardments.14
·
·
Turkish authority ceased to exist.

One thousand eight hundred

marines landed, and after putting a stop to the looting, prepared to hold
the city. This they did from the time of landing until the arrival of
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the main Italian force on October 11 and 12, all the while being
harassed by enemy marksmen.
On one occasion when the Turkish skirmishers pressed in to
within 300 yards of the Boumellian Wells, the warships anchored
off the coast fired 12-inch shells into the desert for hours
together, the result of which active defense was three Turks
killed and one wounded by rifle fire.15
With near nonchalance, under clear skies, the 20,000 men of the
11

conquering army, their material and supplies, were unloaded.
11

Civil

authority was proclaimed and few, if any, military precautions were
taken against counter-attack by the Turkish force.

The Italians under

General Caneva assumed that the local Arabs were friendly and,
~ •. no effort was made to collect from the population the ten
to fifteen thousand stand of magazine rifles that was known had been
distributed to them from the hold of the Derna: no adequate measures
were taken to police the town and its environment gr to picket the
outlying villages and hamlets in the palm-groves. 1

Encouraged by their easy success in Tripoli, the Royal Government widened the scope of operations to include the major coast towns.
The procedure was much the same in each case: the fleet
blustered up and fired shell into obsolete Turkish defences, and
then sailors and troops were put on shore. At Tobruk and Derna but
little opposition, if any, was experienced, but at Benghazi and
Khoms (Homs) the local Turkish garrisons, helped by the Arabs made
strenuous resistance, - so much so that the Italian Government
immediately became alarmed, and established a censorship of all news
from Cyrenaica, in hope of concealing the truth • . . The opposition
was driven back all along the coastline, but not before the Italians
had suffered about 500 casualties. In no case had the oppostion
been crushingly defeated, and the Arabs and the Turks, though they
had perforce to fall back, never lost to~ h with the Italians or
ceased to harass them on every occasion.

7

By the end of the first fortnight in Tripoli, the Italian
quick-claim strategy of occupation had been foiled.

Their plans for

destroying the Ottoman fleet, occupying the major coastal cities, waiting
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for the surrender of the Turkish force and then buying off the Arab
chiefs, which would lead to pacification of the country, had come to
In fact,

naught.

The Turkish fleet had escaped: the Arabs at Benghazi had made
common cause with the Turks; and the Porte had politely told Italy
11
to do its damnedest/' but that it would not relinquish its sovereign
rights over Tripoli. 18
The activity, or lack of activity, during this period prompted
Herbert Gibbons to make the following judgment:
Here at Constantinople we call this a war that is no war. The
Turks are not fighting yet. The Italians apologize for fighting.
Perhaps in a few weeks we shall be calling the Turco-Italian war
19
of 1911 a fiasco, a war that began and ended without fighting •
Events in the near future were to prove Mr. Gibbons wrong.
Through the eyes of aerial reconnaissance, the massing of Turkish-Arab
forces in the oases around Tripoli was seen:
thousands 11 at the oasis of Zanzur, twelve miles southwest
of Tripoli; at Ainzara, about equidistant to the south; and again at
the oasis of Azizia, still farther south of Ainzara. Instead of
profiting by this information and advancing to des troy these
Turkish forces in detail, the Italians awaited developments in their
trenches. On the morning of the 23rd of Octob~6 the Turks discovered
that two-thirds of the oasis was open to them.
,.

••

11

The' ensuing· attack found the I tali ans woefully unprepared.
After the army had landed, they had taken over basic positions established
by the marines.

Little had been done to improve the fortifications and

aside from air reconnaissance no attempt was made to be aware of the
movement of Turkish-Arab forces.
The Turkish leaders had planned a two-pronged attack on the
Italian forces guarding Tripoli:

a frontal attack of the Italian lines
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with combined Turkish-Arab forces was to be followed by a rear attack
by the Derna - armed Arabs from within the oasis.
Advancing through an area the Italians had failed to clear for
a field of fire, the open Italian flank was discovered and the TurkishArab frontal attack was launched.
In a few minutes a cloud of Arabs were attacking the Bersaglieri
in the rear. So unprepared were the Bersaglieri for such a development, that the officers believed the attack from the rear to be a
mistake on the part of friendly Arabs, and for a time they restrained
their men from answering it. Then the full significance of their
awful predicament burst upon them • • • 21
The Italian lines were broken.

Panic and terror reigned in the

town of Tripoli where the wrath of the armed Arab populace was turned
on the Italian soldiers. Only after Italian reserves were called into
the fray were the Turkish-Arab forces driven from the occupied portion
of the oasis.
In the aftermath of the October 23 uprising, shock and apprehension fell upon the army.
The terrible losses of the Bersaglieri: the massacre of unfortunates caught in the cactus alleyways; and the general hopelessness,
bred of inactivity, had an evil effect upon an army that had started
the campaign with a skeleton in its cupboard: . • . All the lurid
legends of Abyssinia, that it had heard from childhood, came back
to it as facts tn war about :to be rep:>eated. There was only one
military measure that Caneva could order ••• reprisals •.•• The
orders were issued ••• that the oasis should be immediately cleared,
and that all male Arabs found with arms in their hands or who were
shown, from circumstantial or other evidence, to h~~e been implicated in the rising, should be summarily executed.
The ensuing "reprisals" were widely reported by the foreign
press, and were labeled atrocities.

Francis M'Cullagh, writing for

The World Today, charged that "About 400 women and children and 4000
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men have been shot.

Cripples, blind beggars, sick people ••• Worse

than any Russian Pogrom or Armenian massacre .•• 23 The actions of
11

the Italian troops against the civilian inhabitants of Tripoli have advocates both pro and con.

Documentary evidence 24 and eye-witness

accounts verify the fact that noncombatants, as well as combatants, were
sacrificed to the fury of the frenzied Italian forces.
Again on October 28~ the Turkish forces launched a frontal
attack on the Italian lines and a bloody battle ensued. The Turks on
two occasions nearly overwhelmed the defenders.
again averted by the bringing in of reserves.

Italian defeat was
A momentary victory was

won.
The price of victory, however, had been high - so high that the
staff at last awoke to the danger of the oasis. Instead of bringing up a brigade and clearing the oasis with the bayonet for good
and all, as they might easily have done that afternoon, they decided to contract their front on this flank and retire the line
about a mile while they cabled to Italy for another infantry
division.25
In this, the first major battle between the Italian and TurcoArab forces, the Italians had come off second best.
at a maximum the Turkish force was composed of

11

•

•

Kepi estimated that
•

2,400 Turks and

just under 5,000 Arabs. Perhaps even less. The Italians were nearly
50,000 strong. 112 6 John Q. Wood, the American consul in Tripoli during
the war, asserted that 50,000 soldiers were available to the Italian
commander in the city of Tripoli.
II.
~

.

In the same dispatch, he stated that

• a fierce engagement took place on the 26th Lof October/ in which

many Italians were killed and·wounded and it is also estimated that
some 2,000 Arabs were also killed. 11 27
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Beyond the loss of flesh, there was the loss of Italian prestige and spirit and the commensurate increase of Turkish prestige and
spirit. The Turks had forced the Italians back toward the sea and had
taken up the former Italian positions. The Italian plan for the occupation of Tripoli, soon to be followed by Turkish surrender, had been
stymied.
Cholera had broken out in the city of Tripoli as early as
October 11 and by month's end, a near epidemic was raging.
on November 7, leaving 125 Italians dead.

It crested

As the cholera raged, war

activities returned to their former level of Italian entrenchment and
Turkish-Arab guerrilla action against them.

Heavy seas had forced the

Italian fleet, with the exception of two ships, back to sea just prior
to the onslaught on Italian positions on October 23 and 26.

In the

aftermath of those fierce actions, the Italian force retrenched and
l i eked its wounds with out attempting offensive opera ti ans. Any thought
of such operations were precluded from November 15 through late November
by torrential tropical rains that turned the city of Tripoli and its environs into a quagmire.

So, "From the 26th of October until the 26th of

November, a constant guerilla warfare was kept up, but no important engagements took p]ace. 28
11

With the return of good weather, a combined Italian operation
was launched against the Turks and their Arab allies.

Naval bombard-

ments, aero-reconaissance and artillery shelling opened the way for a
sweep through the arm of the Tripoli oasis occupied by the Turks and
Arabs. This sweep was accomplished by one brigade and four infantry
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regiments. After two days' fighting, the Italians had reclaimed the
positions they had lost on the 23rd and 26th of October.

In these

positions, they found the bodies of their forty fallen comrades .. Those
comrades had suffered the ravages of exposure to a month of desert sunshine and torrential rain, as well as the inhumanities inflicted upon
them by the victorious Arab troops.

As in the case of the Italian

excesses, the actual extent of atrocity was probably sensationalized.
Whatever the case, the acts of the Arab warriors against the Italian
soldiers, medical and Red Cross corps /mutilated, crucified, impaled,
ripped open, et cetera7 have been we 11 documented for pas teri ty ., 29
With this indication of the marginal success of the Italian
operation in Tripoli in mind, a summary of Italian operations along the
coast is in order.

On October 22, John Q. Wood reported that 11 Tobruk,

Dern a, Benghazi, Homs have been taken by the Ita 1ians. 11 30 Derna was
taken on the 16th by a combined Italian force of five warships, three
destroyers and transports with a battalion of troops, against a Turkish
garrison of only a hundred men with two guns.

Benghazi was taken on the

18th with the assistance of four battle ships, four cruisers, three
destroyers and two flotillas of torpedo boats.

After bombardment,

4,000 troops captured the city in night assault.
The accounts of these peripheral actions

LT.e.

at Derna, Benghazi,

Tobruk and Khoms/ are not well documented and in some instances are
contradictory;~' Kepi in a summary paragraph relates,
There have been throughout the month attacks by Turkish led
and organized Arabs against both Derna and Benghazi. In all of
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these the Italians have held their own, while at Benghazi they
appear to have had a certain amount of success. There was one
determined attack upon Khoms toward the end of October in which
the Turks and Arabs lost heavily; but the most serious losses
that the Turkish garrison suffered outside the Tripoli oasis were
at Derna, where during an unsuccessful attack, the forces organized
by Enver Bey had over l 00 ki 11 ed in one act.ion. 31
Youssouf Zia's dispatch relative to the latter engagement reads
as follows:
••. vi-ctory gained over the Italians on October 28 at Derna by
the Imperial troops reinforced by Senousians under the command of
Enver Bey ••. two days late due to communications problem. (enclosure from Assini} . . • great victory at Derna. Eighteen guns and
a considerable quantity of' arms and ammunition have been taken from
the enemy whose losses amount to five hundred killed. Our losses
consist of eighty dead and as many wounded. The supplies and ammunition taken enough to maintain our forces for a long while.32
Italian Victory? Turkish Victory? Propaganda on both sides?
Depending on one's point of view, each implied conclusion is possible.
In any case, San Giuliano on November 1, 1911, wrote that the
Italians were
.

~

11

victorious without exception ••• by sea and land

• had •.• repelled all assaults.

Since our last victory at Tripoli

and Homs there has been no other engagement. 11 33
Soon after this initial phase of the Turco-Italian war had been
concluded, Wilson, the American Ambassador in Rome dispatched,
As coast of Tripoli is practically subdued there will soon be
no further need for Navy in those waters and Prime Minister said
that a blow would be struck at Turkey directly.34
On November 15, a dispatch from Leishman, the American Consul in
Berlin, observed that the
strain~d.

11

• stand still LTn Tripolj_/ becoming more

Italy may be forced to extend their naval operations to the

Asiatic coast • . . 11 35
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With this premonition of things to come, a return to the theater
around Tripoli on December 4.
the campaign .

.

.,
II

11

The most important military movement of

to date, had just occurred. Three divisions of

Italian troops had been involved in a pivotal sweep from the oasis of
Tripoli:
: ••• over the rolling desert and reached Ain Zara, a small oasis
located about ten miles south, so that at 5 P.M., the Italian line
extended from sea through oasis, twelve miles due south to AinZara • • . • artillery most important part •.• captured a few Arabs,
guns, ammunition ••• Effective operation .•• Already the chiefs
of several desert towns have come to Tripoli to sue for peace.36
The Italian battle plan had changed.

From the static position

of bombard, occupy and wait for Turkish capitulation, the realization
had come that the Turks with the enlisted Arab natives were not gofog
to roll over and play dead.

In the face of Italian discontent with the

war on the home front,37 positive action had to be taken.
The main Turkish-Arab force was centered at Gharian, approximately fifty miles south of Tripoli.

From there, the guerrilla attacks

at Italian coastal positions had been launched. The Italian strategy
turned to one of extending fortified positions into the desert from
which to attack the enemy stronghold. To accomplish this, an initial
plan was set to establish a railroad line from Tripoli to Ain-Zara, and
from there to press forward to the Gharian Hills.

The railroad to

Ain-Zara was expected to be completed by the end of February, 1912.
It would seem that the whole campaign has been fought on the
theory that no chances must be taken. · The contra l ling idea has not
been so much to injure the enemy as to prevent him from defeating
the Italians in a single engagement .•• Adowa complex ••• The
General-in-command says he will not advance until he has 150 automobiles and 5,000 camels ••• 38
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At the close of 1911, the Italians had 95,389 soldiers and about
6,000 officers in Tripoli - a force of 101,389 men. They had ten monoplanes and biplanes, two dirigibles, one Draken balloon and fifteen
aviators. The home front had supplied •
5,600 horses ••• 9,200 mules, 400 gu.rs in 100 batteries ••
12,000 oxen ••• 40,000 quintels of timber for fuel ~ ~ • 60,000
quintels flour . • . 43,000 quintels hay •.• 7,000 tons water
• ~ • 30,000 tons biscuits and preserved meat •.• 2~~000 tons
barley . • . 17,000 hectolitres wine ••• et cetera.
In the words of Wood,

11

It {fhe Italian army} certainly hasn't

lacked anything money could secure •.• The army has lacked nothing
money could procure. 11 40 When General Caneva asked for 10,000 soldiers,
he received 20,000; when he requested 5,000 camels and 150 cars, the
Italians, prohibited from obtaining camels in Tunis, imported them from
Eritrea, and auto factories in Turin and Milan worked day and night to
provide for the army's need.
Contrary to what had happened in the Abyssinian war, the Government estimates and grants were made on a generous scale, even exceeding what was asked for by the military • . . Thus, with the
exception of a few surprises and some incidental delays, military
operations proceeded slowly and cautiously, but on the whole
successfully. The war was hampered by another set of diffi cul ti es,
arising out of the conditions imposed by the powers, who feared
complications in the Balkans and in the East, and were anxious that
Turkey should not be too seriously injured, she being as Giolitti
wrote, to some extent 11 armed by her foreign debts 11 • It was Giolitti
also,
who said that Italy in the war had been forced, as it were,
to 11 dance upon eggs" being restrained from the rapid achievement
and firm action which her superiority at sea would have rendered
possible.41
Through the eyes of Wood, from the capture of Ain-Zara on
December 4, through January 30, 1912, only three minor engagements took
place in the area around Tripoli.

Setting the scene, he stated that the
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Italians entrenched ••• have made no attempt to push their
lines into the interior although they have over 5,000 soldiers at
Homs, 2~~000 at Benghazi, and 17,000 divided between Derna and
Tobruk.
The first minor engagement was south of Ain-Zara at Bir Tobas
on December 19. Two thousand Italian troops under General Pecori were
ambushed by 2,500 Turks, while giving aid to an Arab family.

Under the

leadership of Colonel Fara, the Italian troops retreated to Ain-Zara
with 22 dead and 150 wounded. Colonel Fara was promoted to General as
a result of his exemplary behavior.
The second engagement was on January 18, at Gargaresch. An
Italian force under General Fara, sent to procure stones for a breakwater at Tripoli, was attacked in the morning by a small band of Turks
and Arabs.

At noon, 1,500 Arabs renewed the attack and were repulsed

through the firing of fort guns and mountain artillery, as well as the
rifle fire of the Italian troops.

By early evening, the field of battle

was quiet. The Turkish-Arab force had suffered approximately 100 dead
and 300 wounded; the Italians 10 dead and 52 wounded.

Upon the with-

drawal of the enemy force, the Italians found themselves entrenched in
a strategic position.

General Fara was then ordered to retreat from it

by the commander of the army, General Caneva. Two requests to occupy
the position were denied.
On the 19th not an Arab or Turk was to be seen and on the 20th
it is to be noted that another commanding officer was sent to retake the positions General Fara was fo~ced to leave. Naturally the
inference is drawn that General Fara has been receiving too many
honors and applause to please his superior; the general impression
must have reached their ears that he is considered to be the only
real fighting General stationed in Tripoli.43
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The third engagement, on January 28, started with a TurkishArab attack at Gargaresch just after midnight. The action was moved to
Ain-Zara at 3 a.m., where the Turks and Arabs fired a few shots at
Italian positions. The focus of the attack, on the Bumiliane water
wells, at the edge of the oasis of Tripoli, came at dawn.

After raid-

ing Turks and Arabs were driven off, one hundred of their number were
buried; two Italians had been killed and fifteen wound~d. At the completion of these minor engagements, the Turco-Italian land war reverted
to the static level of a waiting game.
The Italian plan of conquest of Tripoli had been frustrated on
land. Their reluctance to leave fortified positions and their willingness
to let the Ottoman forces brfng the war to ·them, had not resulted in any
decisive victories.

Until the railroad to Ain-Zara was complete, there

was little prospect of an advance on the Turkish-Arab forces in the
hinterland.
As it began to dawn upon them /the Italians7 that, on account
of the Decree of Annexation in November, it was impossible to bring
the Ottoman Government to terms without a decisive military action
all turned to the Navy. It was believed that a naval attack on one
of the large coast cities, especially Saloniki, would bring the war
to a close.4 4
Action of the Italian fleet was not limited to 11 a naval attack"
or II one 11 coast city.

The odess ey of Italian naval adventure and the

reaction of the Porte can be traced through the random series of diplomatic dispatches that follow:
December 1, 1911: Khokha (small fishing village) ••• bombarded
by Italian man-of-war, the whole village is reported to be burnt down,
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some of the natives killed and wounded and plenty of sambuks (sailing boats) sunk and heavily damaged.45
December 24, 1911: The Italian Warship Puglia seized in the
Red Sea the Steamer 11 Menseleh 11 for Hodeihah with t30,000 aboard.46
11

11

January 14, 1912: The cruiser 11 Piedmonte 11 and 2 destroyers encountered 7 Turkish gunboats and armed yacht off Kunfuda ••• all
the gunboats were destroyed and yacht captured also guns and other
trophies. The warships were dispatched to intercept the gunboats
which were conveying arms to the troops intending to enter Cyrenaica
via Egypt.47
·
January 19, 1912: ••. an Italian warship bombarded Khanyunas,
Syria, close to the Egyptian frontier.48
January 22, 1912: Italian declaration blockade Ottoman Coast
between ••• Ras Isa ••. to Ras Gaulaidai ••.• 49
January 27, 1912: . • . bombarded Fort Jabana, 150 shells set
fire two tents and killed a goat.SO
January 30, 1912: The Italians are effectively blockading the
Yemen coast. The British Consul at Hodeidah has requested the
presence of a warship at Italians are threatening to bombard the
town.51
·
January 31, 1912: The Italian cruiser 11 Piedmonte 11 seized a motor
launch belonging to Thornycrofts flying the Union Jack.5 2
February 7, 1912: • • • shipping in the Red Sea has been. greatly
endangered by the action of the Government of Turkey in extinguishing tg~ lights in the Red Sea. Numerous protests have resulted
ti!

ti!

•

February 13, 1912: .•• torpedoes (contact mines) in the Kara
Bouroun entrance to the Golf of Saloniki • . • . 54
February 24, 1912: Three Italjjo war vessels just arrived in
front of harbor here ••• /B"eirut/~ 0 The Italians: (bombarded?)
harbor and sank Turkish torpedo boats .•• Action of Admiral not
justified as he did not limit the bombardment to the Turkish torpedo
boats.56 If American cruiser in vicinity I suggest that it be sent
immediately to protect American interests.57 ·
April 6, 1912: /Italia.Q.7 ••. blockade referred to will on
April eighth be extended from Rasisa .•• to Loheia ••• 58
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April 18, 1912: Four men-of-war and about twenty destroyers
bombarded today Samos and attacked fort near entrance Dardanelles.59
••• an attack by an Italian fleet on Fort Koumkale, at the entrance of the Dardanelles, on the island of Samos, decision of the
Ottoman Government to close the Dardanelles to navigation until
further notice.60
·
April 19, 1912:

• . . Lemnos is occupied ••. 61

From rather an inauspicious beginning in December 1911, the
Italian naval campaign escalated to the point of bombarding the fort at
the entrance of the Dardanelles in mid-April and occupation of the
Dodecanese Islands in May.
Logically, through the duration of these blatant escapades, at
least one of the Powers should have become alienated enough to intervene
in the struggle between the Turks and Italians.

But not even these

capricious actions could budge the Powers from their ultra-neutral posture.
tions.

Nor did the retaliatory actions of the Porte change their posiNo Great Power was yet ready to open the Pandora's Box that

might lead to a general European war.
The action of the Italians against:
• • . Beirut . • • and • . • the Dardane 11 es • • • has been taken
by Turkish pride more as a ?timulant than as a rebuff. The conquest
of Tripoli by Italy has not been advanced thereby, and the pressures
put on the neutral powers by the interruption of trade through the
straits has not been sufficient to bring about the intervention which
many think Italy sought for by this otherwise useless coup.62
If, in fact, the naval program of Italy was designed to influence
the Powers to intervene on behalf of Italy, San Giuliano's placating
statement that follows the bombardment of the fort at the entrance to
the Dardane 11 es is surprising:
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The Royal Italian Government had neither the intention of
attacking and trying to force the Dardanelles, nor effectuating
a landing, in fact no troops were embarked on the warships. The
fleet had not received orders to attack the Dardanelles, the
Government being desirous of taking such steps only in case of
necessity. The aim was simpl,y to make a naval demonstration in
the Aegean with the following objects:
First: to prove the complete liberty of actions of the Italian
Government in regard to military operations and to dissipate an
illusion as to the invulnerability of the Ottoman territory.
Second: to counterbalance the efforts of the Ottoman Government
to persuade the populations of the Empire that the Italian Naval
forces are incapable of facing the powerful Turkish fleet •••• the
Ottoman fleet did not take up the challenge to action and refused
to leave the shelter of the Dardanelles.
Third: to check contraband of war from the parts of the Aegean
which has recently greatly increased.
Fourth: to make the government of the Sultan feel the penalty
of war.63
·
Here then, ostensibly, is the Royal Italian policy. Through
blatant actions, Italy seemingly hoped to arouse the Great Powers to
accede in her behalf, and that they would, in turn, coerce the Porte to
cede Tripoli to the Royal Italian Government.

Failing to gain support

and perhaps fearing to proceed further toward igniting the European
powder keg, Italy, backed down.

Italy's "diplomacy by naval bombardment

and high sea harrassment had failed to further her aims as miserably as
11

had her land operations in Tripoli.
By February 22, the railroad to Ain-Zara had been completed.
All the necessary men, materiel and supplies had been pooled at Tripoli
in anticipation of the advance against the Ottoman forces in the Gharian
Hills. Just prior to the moment the advance was to begin, a change in
plan was announced.
; ••• the approach to the Gharian would be made via Zan-Zur to
the West of Tripoli instead of via Zan-Zara • . . .
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~ •• It looks therefore as if no forward movement would take
place for several months •••• 64

New preparations were begun. A branch track from the TripoliAin-Zara line was started to Gargaresch, a little oasis between Tripoli
and Zan-Zur.

On June 8th, the military march on Zan-Zur began.

With

12,000 troops supported by fire from three Italian cruisers and battleships, plus artillery, the Arabs were finally extracted from Zan-Zur at
the point of bayonets.

The Arabs lost approximately 1,500 killed, the

Italians 40 killed and about 300 wounded.
The Italians also drove the Arabs from Azizia located on the
road from Zan-Zur to the Gharians.

They thereby captured the key to the

caravan route formerly used by the Turks, making it more difficult for
them to acquire provisions.
Homs was attacked by Arab forces on June 12. Caught in an
Italian flanking movement, about a thousand Arabs perished:
bayoneted and about 500 shot.

500

The Italians admitted to 35 dead and

sixty wounded.
On June 15 - 16, an Italian landing and subsequent engagement
at Misrata resulted in the:
•.• easiest victory of the campaign. Artillery barrage,
bayonet charge: Arabs over 600 killed, Italians less than 40 killed
with 100 plus wounded, Arabs cut off from Benghazi. Complete Italian
domination of the entire Tripolitan coast.65
On June 26 - 28, at Sidi Said, a fierce battle culminated in a
bayonet charge.

The Arabs fled in confusion leaving over 1,000 dead.

The Italians counted 40 dead, 200 wounded.

The majority of these were

Ascari troops from Eritrea who had joined the Italian forces.
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By early July, 1912, the Italian campaign again ground to a
halt. Wood ventured to say that with naval cooperation Zuara and Zauia
could easily be taken, ·11 • • • but it is doubtful that they will be
occupied before Fall as the intense heat ••. has arrested operations
on a large scale and it seems to be the regular plan to make extensive
preparations for small advances . . • 11

Looking forward with 11 enthusiasm

and confidence" to the Fall campaign, approximately one-third of the
Italian officers returned to. Italy for a vacation. On the other side of
the coin, the

11
•••

Arabs have given up on Turk ••. Opinion is univer-

sal that the Italian has come to stay. 11 66
On August 5, with the resumption of offensive activity, the
Zuara oasis was abandoned by Arab forces before Italian land and naval
forces attacked.
On August 15, about ten miles south of Tripoli, six Arabs were
killed and 90 wounded. The oasis of Redgaline, the watering spot for
Turkish caravans, was captured by the Italians in this encounter.
Other small skirmishes continued to occur, and Wood stated that
II

After a year Arabs still dangerous along coast. Arabs still ready

to fight ••. The Italians have erected stone and block for fortifications at Tripoli, Benghazi, andHoms. 11 67
On Septe·mber 7, General Caneva left Tripoli.

"Having carried

through with favorable result the first phase .of the military operations
in Libya wit~ the effective occupation of the vast extent of shore from
Cape Macabez to Cobruk /sic7, the Government, in order to further operations towards the interior • . .

11

divided his former command. Tripolitania
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was to be governed from Tripoli by Lieutenant General Ragni and
Cyrenaica was to be governed from Benghaz.i by Lieutenant Briccola. This
was in." ••• harmony with the different military conditions of the two
districts.II

General Caneva's

11
•••

desire, which he repeatedly ex-

pressed, of being relieved of so great a responsibility .••11 68 , was
fulfilled. But to what avail? Already the military operations in Libya
were virtually complete.
On September 17, an engagement near the town of Derna was fought
to relieve the town from Turkish artillery fire and to rescue a tactical
position for a successful advance on the Gharian.

Softened by Italian

artillery fire on the. 14th, the Arabs finally gave way in hand-ta-hand
attack on the 17th.

Over 1,300 Arabs died. The Italians lost 70 dead

and 150 were wounded~
The Italians under General Caneva had not attempted to occupy
the oasis of Zan-Zur on June 8, after they had driven the Arabs out.

In-

stead they had taken possession of a fort about two miles to the east.
On September 20th, with the rail road nearing completion, it became necessary to occupy the oasis to keep the Arabs from tearing up the
tracks to Zan-Zur.

In the last major battle of the Tripolitan war,

approximately 18,000 Italians and 15,000 Turkish-Arab forces clashed.
In the face of Italian naval bombardment, Draken balloons and "aeroplanes'', the Arabs.charged with reckless abandon and captured Italian
gun emplacements.

In the ensuing hand-to-hand combat, unable to remove

the guns, the Ottoman forces retreated. The retreat turned into a rout
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of the Arabs in which they left more than 1,500 dead on the field.

The

Italians acknowledged 20 dead and 450 wounded.
In the aftermath of the battle, General Ragni remained throughout the night on the field of battle. A rumor was circulated that the
Italians

11

•••

had experienced a serious day. 69 A question about the
11

tremendous reliance of the Italian forces on naval bombardment and artillery was voiced.

How would the Italians fare in the hinterland with

no naval, and little artillery support? How effective would Italian
rifle fire be against mobile Arab forces in their desert environment?
If the Arabs can take the Italian guns (Zan-Zur) near the sea,
what will they do in the Desert?
The Italians have never been able to follow up a fight and for
that reason there has never been a decisive battle through the
whole ~ear ••. One d8esn 1 t hear so much- about an immediate advance
to the Ghari an. • • .7
The war that was not supposed to be a war had finally gasped
to a conclusion. Over a year before, the Italians had envisioned a
quick and easy operation that would result in the cession of Tripoli to
her. That golden vision had been shattered when the Arabs made common
cause with the Turks to repulse the invading enemy.

From the first

Turkish-Arab offensive against the entrenched Italians, the war took
on the character of a stop-and-go-wind-up-toy.
With a preponderance of men and material, the Italian forces
came to Tripoli and camped on the coast.

From there they fought inactiv-

1

ity, the sun, world opinion, the rain, cholera, the desert and the
logistics of supply, as much as they fought the declared enemy., Most
significantly, perhaps, they fought themselves and the stigma of their
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past national identity.

The monstrous defeat of the Italian force at

Adowa in 1896, seemingly hung over each decisi-0n as to how the war should
proceed. Most often the decision, based on indecision, was to wait
••• for more troops, or more materiel, for Fall, or the railroad to
Ain-Zara, or the railroad to Zan-Zur . • .
Conservatism was the key to the Italian land operations in
Tripoli. Diametrically opposed to conservatism on land was the aura of
recklessness on sea.

The random and sometimes senseless bombardments

in the Red and Aegean Seas were certainly calculated to force intercession of the Powers on Italy's behalf.
her coveted goal.

Neither tactic won for Italy

The Italian victory in Tripoli was not won by force

of arms, but by default.

Even though the Arabs had become disenchanted

with the Turkish defense of Tripoli, they were still a viable and active
force as the war ended. Turkey was willing to conclude the war with
the Italians only because of the greater threat to her sovereignty by
the Balkan War that had started with the declaration of war by
Montenegro on October 8, 1912.
On October 15, the announcement came from Constantinople, "Preliminaries peace with Italy were signed at Ouchy . . • and finally, . . .
treaty of peace signed at Lausanne on October 18th .

71

The Tripolitan War was over; the "sick old man of Europe" had
capitulated in Tripoli.
John Q. Wood, the American Consul in Tripoli, who reported
rather faithfully the events of the war, filed a curious and yet somewhat profound dispatch in its aftermath.
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There is a distinct disappointment among the army officers in
losing an opportunity of fighting their way to the Gharian Hills •
• • However, I believe the Italian soldier is very contented and is
counting the days remaining before his service sha 11 end in
Tripoli. 72

CHAPTER IV
DIPLOMATIC REACTION OF THE POWERS TO THE TRIPOLITAN WAR
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been 11 deeded 11 to Italy through
diplomatic agreements with the Powers of Europe.

From her inclusion in

the Triple Alliance in 1882, through the Racconigi agreement with Russia
in 1909, Italy had gained the right to cut from the Ottoman Empire the
last available section of North African land.
The Italian ultimatum to Turkey, and the declaration of war that
followed within twenty-four hours, caught the Powers off-guard. Nonetheless, the Powers had "promised" Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to Italy,
and as long as the war was confined to the Tripolitain, their reactions
were generally restrained.
Strangely enough, the Entente Powers accepted Italy's precipitous
ultimatum and occupation more readily than did Italy's Triplice allies.
The diplomatic positions of the two alliance systems, however, reversed
themselves as Italy widened the scope of the war.
The Entente Powers tended to move away from Italy while Germany
and Austria encouraged her efforts.
Regardless of the particular stances of the Powers throughout the
Tripolitan War, the fact remains that no Power was willing to intervene
between the combatants. Mediation was offered by the Powers of Europe,
but no direct action to force a conclusion to the war was taken.
At the outset of the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912, William Howard
Taft, not Theodore Roosevelt, was the President of the United States of
55
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America.

As a consequence of this, American reaction to that war

followed the line of 11 no-mediation 11 and 11 non-involvement. 11
On September 29, 1911, Oscar S. Strausl posed mediation between
Italy and Turkey, saying in part:
Our country has a justified duty to preserve peace and ~revent
holy war. We are free of alliances and welcome the right of mediation which the Hague Convention gives us the International mandate
to exercise. Italian rights and interests should be gained through
the Hague Tribunal.2
Also on September 29, 1911, the Turkish Ambassador Zia Pasha,
dateline Bellport, wrote:
For the President of the United States to act as mediator in
the dispute between Turkey and Italy would be to fill a magnificent
role, and prove a great practical step to international peacemaking
. .

~

~

.3

Contrary to these press reports on the role that America might
play in the interests of peace, official communications were very negative. On September 29, Acting Secretary of State Adee writing to
President Taft, summarized pertinent articles of the Hague Convention
regarding mediation, and concluded by saying:

11

This Department has not

been informed of any appeal by either Italy or Turkey for the offices of
powers of mediation. 11 4 This was followed, on September 30, by a message
to Secretary of State Knox who was vacationing in Hot Springs, Virginia.
After expressing his reluctance

11
•••

to take any course in the European

question •.• 11 , he concluded by saying:
Italy would regard any action as indicating a United States
interest in Tripoli due to our attitude on the de Cou murder. The
Italian consul opposes U.S. explorers. Finally, there has been no
communication from Italy or Turkey. We can take no action with no
word.5
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Knox, in a telegram to President Taft in Hastings, Nebraska,
said:

11

! oppose the Straus suggestion.

The European Powers would re-

ject mediation. The only solution is from Europe • . . 11 6
Alvey Adee put the cap on the American position in the first
sentence of his October 4 telegram to Consul Rockhill in Constantinople:
"It would be desirable to avert any formal request for the mediation of
the United States. 11 7
The United States. finally. on October 20, 1911, issued a proclamation of neutrality toward Italy and Turkey.
Throughout the war, despite appeals to the President

11

,

••

a peacemaker to interfere. 118 , urgings to the Secretary of State 11

~

as

..

to use official influence to induce Turkey and Italy to arbitrate.119,
and the voiced fears from various areas of commercial interests (cotton
seed oil, goatskin trade, tobacco, petroleum, and rails)lO, the Government's position changed only slightly. The notable exception was the
sending of the warship Chester to Derna

11

•••

to protect the American

Archeological mission. 1111
The American reaction. then, to the Tripolitan War was one of,
if not complete disinterest, certainly non-intervention and hopeful
non-involvement in the European sphere of influence.
A New York Times article of September 26. 1911, had an apocalyptic vision of this reaction:
••• it is improbable that there will be any American interference between Italy and Tripoli. Americans have considerable trade
with Tripoli •.• but it is said at the State Department that so
long as existing treaty relations are left unimpaired there will be
no ground for intervention.12
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The reaction of the English press was much stronger than that
of American.

In fact, it was much stronger than that of the British

Foreign Office. While one English newspaper called Italy a "pirate,
brigand, and buccaneer", 13 Sir Edward Grey could only say that there
might be "inconvenient consequences" caused by the "extreme steps" that
England's friend .Italy had taken.14 While being open

11

•••

to bri_nging

about an arrangement between Italy and Turkey on first favourable
opportunity . • . 11 , Grey had replied to the Italian Ambassador on
September 29 that in the event of war, the English position would be
one of non-intervention.15
Mediation at the "first favourab 1e opportunity" and II non-interventi on11 at all times were the bases from which England approached the
developments in the Tripolitan War.

Even when, during the war, the

Straits were closed to England's vital grain trade, she offered to
mediate in conjunction with the other Powers, but gave no hint of intervention.
The rationale for this position is revealing and was given by
Sir Arthur Nicolson on October 2, 1911. He wrote that it seemed
"exceedingly foolish" to alienate Italy,
••• with whom we have always been on the most friendly terms
and whose friendship to us is of very great value, in order to keep
well with Turkey, who has been a source of great annoyance to us
and whose Government is one of the worst that can be imagined. I
should far prefer Italy as a neighbor to Egypt than the Turks.16
Mr. Winston Churchill had expressed the same view in stronger
language some days before. Observing that England stood both to gain
and lose by the Italian adventure and that the reactions to it would
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be 11 deep 11 , he stated that England must choose Italy over Turkey"~ . .
on all grounds - moral and immoral. 11 17 England chose Italy, for better
or worse, and in preparation for the trouble that Nicolson felt would be
caused by Turkey, espoused the attitude of complete neutrality.18
England was most desirous of having the war between Italy and
Turkey end. This want stemmed not necessarily from humanitarian wishes,
but from concern for the continuation of the prosperous British trade.
To that end she was anxious to arrange a settlement between the two
warring states. Grey, on October 5, however, saw no opening for mediation as he felt that the only advice that could be given to Turkey
was ·11 •

~

•

to acquiesce at least in Italian occupation of Tripoli. 11

the fo 11 owing sentence he conjectured that such advice

11

•

•

•

In

would not

gain us the goodwill of Turkey nor be effective. 11 19
The war to which England had given tacit approval because it was
supposed to end quickly did not.

As it continued, England sidestepped

the question of mediation by saying the time was not ripe for mediation,
hoping all the while that Italy would end the conflict with Turkey as
precipitously as she had started it. That hope was not fulfilled.
Grey saw no basis for intercession as proposed by Count Aehrenthal
late in October.

By November 14, because of the reaction of the English

public to the alleged Italian massacres in Tripoli, Grey said,
not be possible for us to make any agreement at this moment. 11 21

11

It will
The

English position at this point moved away from tacit support of the
Italian adventure.
to Italian aims.

At the outset of the war, England had given succor
By November 14, 1911, seeds of disenchantment with Italy
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were sprouting.

Grey said that Engl and could not 11 • • • ask anythtng

from Italy without implying a promise of support in her Tripoli adventure;
and that we cannot give." While he recognized Italy's case for 11• • •
squeezing guarantees for economic interests .•• 11 he felt that Italy
11 ~ • by this time". • • should have accomplished that and gotten out
of the whole affair.22
The seeds of disenchantment grew rapidly.

With Italy's widening

of the war to include the Aegean and Red Seas, Grey vented his changed
feelings:

"Treaty or no Treaty, I think our interest in the grain trade

and commerce shipping in the Black Sea is such that we could not stand
the B1ack Sea trade being stopped by this wretched war. 11 23 Engl and
conceded the need for concerted action to conclude the ever-widening
war.

England complained about the effect the war was having on her

trade.

England did nothing.
On April 12, 1912, Sir Edward Grey wrote that the Turks could

not be blamed for closing the Straits, but that this action"• •• was
causing the. gravest injury to British commercial and shipping interests.24
On April 26, writing to Lowther, Grey reiterated the idea of the importance of the Black Sea trade indicating that it 11 ••. should suffer as
little delay and inconvenience as possible. 11 25 He also reaffirmed the
stance taken at the Hague Conference by His Majesty's Government relative to floating mines now employed by the Turks in closing the Straits,
and His Majesty's Government's 11 . • . strong exception to their employment.1126
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On April 30, Grey again writing to Lowther, characterized the
Turkish decision to not even open a passage through the Straits as
"disappointing and serious."

In the correspondence he went on to say:

Shipowners here state that 150 merchant ships mostly British
representing nearly 1 million tons and in money value about
6,000,000 t, laden with cargoes of very considerable value in
addition to this sum are held up. Shipowners have already lost
about 100,000 t., and each day's delay involves a loss to British
Shipowners of at least 9,000 t. About 4,000 British Officers and
sailors are detained. Besides this value of cargoes of maize may
rapidly deteriorate. 11 27
Looking back over these dispatches, key phrases stand out:
"gravest injury" ••• "strong exception" .

"di sappoi nti ng and

serious." Still a policy of inaction prevailed.
A possible rationalization for this policy was that, except for
France, the other Powers, for reasons of self-interest, were giving
encouragement to Italy to widen her scope of activity.
In February, Grey had asked the Powers if they thought the
Italian Government

11

•••

should be approached with the request to pledge

itself not to force the Dardanelles and neighboring waters. The English
proposal was coldly received everywhere save in Paris. 11 28
On the eve of the settlement between Italy and Turkey, England
had still done nothing.

Her policy of mediation at the "first favourable

opportuniti' and "non-intervention" had been held intact against all the
challenges of the Tripolitan adventure of Italy.

On October 14, 1912,

Sir Edward Grey said in part, "I should be very anxious if the Straits
were closed.

The grain trade was most important at this time of year,

and the closing of the Straits would introduce great complications. 11 29
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Russia, too, was most concerned over the fate of the Straits.
As the Tripolitan War began she gave "warmest approval" to Italy in
hope that Italy would fulfill her obligation from the agreement of
Racconigi.

Italy obviously could not support Russia in the opening of

the Straits while at war with Turkey.

Russia, therefore, turned to a

policy of friendship toward Turkey and by November, 1911

11

•••

her

attitude was anything but favourable to Italy. 11 30
Russi a' s unilateral approach to Turkey in November was doomed
to failure.

The Powers would in no way concur in making the Dardanelles

a Russian lake.

Even if the Porte had been willing, the Powers could

not stand for only Russian warships having free passage in the Straits.
By early December, the Russian proposal to the Porte was withdrawn and
Russia returned to her position of anti-Turkish enmity.31
Turned away from Turkey, Russia turned once again toward Italy.
From February through April, Russia, in a most inconsistent and vacillating manner, urged Italy to force the Dardanelles.32 Nonetheless, in
all her attempts to gain advantage in the Straits through Italy's action
in Tripoli, Russia was thwarted.
France had not yet completed the solution of the Moroccan
question when Italy began action in Tripoli.

Because France still needed

the support of Italy, her attitude toward the occupation was entirely
cordial. That France willingly acquiesced to Italy's claiming her "right"
in Tripoli was not surprising.
was also not surprising.

The French proclamation of neutrality

In retrospect, it seems as though France would

not have had any reaction to Italy's encounter with Turkey had it not
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been for Italy's widening of the war to include the sea lanes of the
Mediterranean.
In an effort to stop Turkish contraband trade that emanated
from Marseilles, the Italians patrolled the waters between Marseilles
and Tunis. On January 16 and 18, the French vessels Carthage and
Manouba, respectively, were stopped by the Italian Argodat and impounded
in Cagliari. On board the former was found an aeroplane and the airman
Duval enroute for Turkish service. On board the latter, there were
twenty-nine Turkish officers impersonating medical staff, bound for
Tunisia. While the settlement of these incidents was being negotiated,
on January 27 the French steamer, Tavignano, was taken to Tripoli, searched
for contraband and released.

French public opinion was incensed by the

blatant action of the Italians. The whole episode was closed by diplomatic action, but in the process French support for the Italian position
was severely diminished. The French, in a surge of nationalism led by
Poincare', became anti-Italian.

Italy, by this action was forced closer

to her Triplice allies.
Desiring

11

•••

to restore the former confidence between Italy

and France . . •11 , France attempted to

II

persuade Turkey to come to

terms." These efforts, related by Poincare' to Tittoni on March 21, were
doomed to failure because of the "insurmountable obstacle" presented by
Italy 1 s decree of annexation of Tripoli. 33 French reaction, then, to the
Italian venture in Tripoli started out on a friendly tone and after the
Carthage/Manoub~ incident, the French attempted to be friendly once again.
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Austria, on the other hand, had from the beginning deplored
Italian action in Tripoli because it might cause hostilities to break
out in the Balkans.

Count Aehrenthal felt it best to" ••• localise

the war to the province of Tripoli, and dissuade Italy from carrying on
hostile operations in other parts of Turkey. 11 34 In other words, the
Austrian policy was aimed toward maintenance of the status quo in the
Balkans; a reiteration of the underpinnings of the Triple Alliance.
In mid-October, 1911, Aehrenthal suggested a five Power peace proposal
to Rome. Nothing came of it. On Novembe.r 27, he urged joint action by
the Powers to prevent Italy from forcing the Dardanelles. The stance
of the Powers remained fixed; no action was taken.

Italy went through

Germany to get Austrian approval for the forcing of the Dardanelles by
Italian fleet bombardment.

In Venice on March 25, the King of Italy

"• •• begged the Kaiser to get Austria s permission for a major naval
1

action by Italy against a Turkish harbour ••• 11 35 A note was then
drafted to Austria which indicated that her opposition to Italy~s desire
to expand the war 1 s theater to include the Turkish coasts "• •.•. was impairing the popularity of theTriplice in Italy, imperilling its renewal
and serving the interests of England and Russia.36
San Giuliano on April 4 forced the issue by saying that if
Austria vetoed Italian action in the.Aegean, Italy would jump the traces
of the Trip 1ice and " • . would carry out a nava 1 action in the face of
Austrian opposition •.• 11 37 Berchtold, the successor of Aehrenthal, on
April 6, communicated the following to San Giuliano:
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••• if the Italian Government finds it indispensable to widen
its theatre of war operations ••• Italy might assure herself of
our tacit, passive attitude in a proaected temporary military
action in areas which do not seem dangerous in respect of a re11
percussion in the Balkans
38
By April 15 Italy had also received the tacit consent of Austria
to occupy the islands of Rhodes, Scarpanto, and Stampalis because
Berchtold doubted whether they were, in fact, Aegean Islands and Avarna
felt that even if occupied, the occupation would only be temporary. 39
Austrian reaction to the Italian endeavors was benign as long
as those Italian endeavors did not disturb the status quo in the Balkans.
Not so that of Germany, especially in the early phases of the
Italian campaign.

The Frankfurter Zeitung, dateline Berlin, September 29,

1911, flung down the gauntlet against Italy, saying:

11

civilized

Europe, disregarding political differences, must protest an act of open
pinage and naked violence, ••. there is no justification for Italy's
brutal methods particularly towards two allies. 11 40
Kaiser Wilhelm's reaction was no less violent, and he envisioned
as a result of Italy's action,

11

•••

a world war with all its terrors. 11 41

His preference for a Turkish victory and not for his Triplice ally was
acidly summed up in a marginal note on October 29:
If the Turks in Stamboul keep their nerves, hold out and provide the Arabs with arms, officers, and supplies, the Italians in
the end, for lack of food and other war supplies, will have to
give up Tripoli •.•• Let the Turks wait quiet~· The Italians
will have to come to them humble and imploring!
The Kaiser, and German reaction cooled during the war and
Germany sought to improve her status with Turkey by offering her services as "honest broker" as the need arose.
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Turkey, from the outset, was anxious to have the Powers intervene or, at least mediate on her behalf against Italy. Numerous
requests from Turkey to the various Powers met as always with denial.
In the words of the American Knox, the solution to the Tripolitan War
lay in Europe. The Powers of Europe refused to force the war between
Italy and Turkey to a conclusion, so they themselves sought solutions in
Lausaunne, Switzerland, in October of 1912.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Italy's imperial dream of someday possessing a colony in the
North African land mass of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica began in 1881.
Until the fateful day of occupation in October 1911, she assiduously
worked to gain the consent and approval of the Powers to fulfill that
dream. The initial step toward her goal came in the offer of a defensive treaty by Germany and Austria in 1882.

By 1902, the treaty of the

Triple Alliance had been turned by Italy into a justification of Italian
aggression in the land she coveted. The tacit agreement of England had
been gained in 1887.

In 1900, Italy traded her recognition of influence

of France in Morocco for eventual settlement of the question of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

In 1909, the final block to Italian interest in

Tripoli was removed through the Racconigi agreement with Russia in which
Italy promised maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans for Russian
approval of her North African enterprise.
The Tripolitan War with Turkey began on September 29, 1911, and
widened to include the seas around Tripoli, the Aegean and Red Seas,
as well as the Mediterranean.

All the pressures that Italy could bring

to bear on Turkey, by land and by sea, with the restraints imposed on
her by the Powers, proved to be of no avail in bringing Turkey to her
knees.
67
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Peace talks between Italy and Turkey began in July, 1912. Three
separate negotiations were held:

official negotiations between Italy and

Turkey at Lausanne; unofficial ones conducted by an Italian agent

11

and an

11

with a name something like Badana at Constantinople
exchange of notes through the German Government. 111

11

•

The solution to the war between Italy and Turkey, once felt by
all the Powers to be quickly attainable, was finally found by the warring states themselves.

Count Aehrenthal 's fear of an outbreak in the

Balkans had been realized. The crush of the Balkan danger pushed the
Turkish Government into

11

•

concluding peace by decree-law, without

the approval of Parliament. 11 2 In a sense, the Tripolitan War was ended
as precipitously by the Turks as it had been started by the Italians.
The victory that Italy had finally won came by default and was
in reality, illusory. The Treaty of Peace signed by the Plenipotentiaries
of the Italian and Turkish Governments at Lausaunne, Switzerland, on
October 18, 1912, laid the basis for cessation of hostilities, prisoner
exchange, general amnesty, suppression of the Post Offices of both
countries, Turkish economic concessions and taxes, Italian funding of
the Public Debt at not less than two million Italian lire per year, and
further difficulties for Italy, Turkey and the Powers of Europe .•
In Article II of the Treaty, the Governments pledged to recall:
•.• their officers and troops, and also their civil functionaries, respectively, the Ottoman Government from Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica, and the Italian Government from the islands in the
Aegean Sea. 3
The withdrawal of the Italians from the Dodecanese Islands was
contingent upon the Turkish withdrawal from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
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Upon this contingency long years of struggle and negotiation lay ahead.
The Ottoman Government had seemingly signed a quit-claim for
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Turks had officially given up the land
that was to be renamed Libya in 1934, but held out hopes for native
resistance against Italian colonial efforts.4
Through the judicious use of bribes, northern Tripolitania was
pacified by the end of 1912. The native resistance, hoped for by Kiamal
Pasha, materialized in Cyrenaica late in that year.

Sulaiman Baruni,

who had set up his capital at Jeffran, called for Italy to recognize him
as the head of an independent Berber state within the confines of Italy's
newly acquired possession. This certainly, in the eyes of the victorious Italians, could not be done. To solve the issue peaceably, the
Italians offered Baruni and his followers two million francs to give up
his claim.

For a peaceable settlement, Baruni insisted on a payment of

four million francs.

This the Italians would not pay, and because the

Arabs had attacked Italian troops and fired on motor cars, they decided
to remove Baruni from Jeffran by force of arms.

Italian troops under

General Lequio routed the followers of Baruni, and he, on April 9, 1913,
crossed the Tunisian border enroute to Constantinople.5
Baruni and his followers had offered the first open resistance
to the Italian pacification of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. After his
threat to Italian sovereignty was put down, it seemed to John Q. Wood
that the Italians would quickly move to a complete pacification of
Cyrenaica, as well as Tripolitania.6 This, too, proved to be illusory.
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The religious order of the Senoussi, led by Ahmed Cherif El
Senoussi, had pledged itself to Enver Bey to continue the fight against
the Italians. The Senoussi Order

11

•••

considered itself the rightful

government of the territory it had undertaken to defend. 11 7
The Italians launched a pacification campaign against Cyrenaica
in the spring of 1913.

By the summer of 1914, the new American consul

in Tripoli, Roderick Dorsey, was able to report to the Secretary of State
11

•••

further progress in the Italian penetration and pacification of

Libya. •
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•

As Europe moved into World War I, the tempo of Senoussi-led
pressure against the Italians increased. The combination of this increased pressure and Italy's withdrawing troops to support the Allied
cause left the inland reaches of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica open to the
armies of the Senoussi.

By August, 1915, the Italians had been forced

back to the coast where they had be.gun their imperial conquest four
years before.
The Italian adventure in almost four years had come full circle.
The benefits of colony that Italy had sought in Tripoli eluded her in
1915.

Italy had poured the blood of her armies and much of her wealth

into the sands of Libya.

In 1915, it looked as though all of this had

been done for naught.
Turkey had actively supported the Arab rebellion in Cyrenaica
from its instigation.

In 1915, when Turkey and Italy were formally at

war again, Turkey increased her aid to the rebellious factions in both
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
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Italy used this resumption of hostilities by Turkey to renounce
Article II of the Treaty of Lausanne; the evacuation of the Dodecanese
Islands. Clause VIII in the secret Treaty of London on April 16, 1915,
guaranteed Italy

11

• full possession of the twelve islands now

occupied. 11 9
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica seemed beyond Italy's grasp, but at
least by treaty authority, her dominance in the Dodecanese was assured.
That dominance was traded away to Greece, contingent upon the ratifica-

'
ti on of the Treaty of Sevres
by Turkey and the A11 i es.

The Treaty of

\

Sevres, drawn on August 10, 1920, however, was not ratified .•
On July 23, 1923, 11 ful 1. possession of the islands now occupied 11
was again accorded Italy in the Second Treaty of Lausanne.10

Italian

occupation of the Dodecanese, as her colonial occupation in Libya,
Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica, lasted until only 1943.

In the aftermath

of World War II, the islands that Italy had seized and inhabited were
wrested from her as the spoils of war and returned to Greece.
When the Italians withdrew to the coast in 1915, the inland
areas reverted to tribal warfare and chaos.

Not until 1916, with the

aid of a British blockade of the Mediterranean coast and British arms,
were the forces of the Senoussi subdued. The interim period of pseudopeace was, however, short-lived.

From the end of World War I through

1923, Italian power in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was slowly consolidated.

Italian 11 diplomatic pacification 11 gave to the Libyans limited

civil and political rights.

In 1923, Italian occupation of Libya was

given final sanction by the second Treaty of Lausanne. This final
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sanction meant little to the Senoussi who once again rose in revolt
against the hard-handed tactics of the Fascists.
In 1924, Ahmed Cherif El Senoussi, appealed to the Italian
nation to oppose

11

•••

the calamities of its government .

March of 1929 much of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was still

II

11

11

In

• unpaci-

fied or unorganized or both • . . 11 12 By June of 1929, however, the
11

chief insurgents

11

in Cyrenaica had surrendered to Italian authority. 13

With the capitulation of their leaders, Senoussi opposition to Italian
occupation dwindled and Italy was given her first pe:aceful opportunity
to develop her North African colony.
The fruits of almost twenty-one years of intermittent fighting
were now to be gathered by Italy.

Between 1932 and 1943, when the

Italians were driven out of Libya by Allied forces, Italy promoted
colonialization and ruled her promised land. The life span of her
colony in Libya was comparatively short and totally unproductive.

Italy

had been the last Power to gain a foothold on the coast of North Africa.
She received from it the least return.

In terms of fulfillment of the

colonial dream that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica would enhance Italy's
prestige, would give her an outlet for her population, and bring monetary reward to her people, there was, in the final analysis, none.
Italy's colonial empire was not in her grasp long enough for
Italy to benefit from the discovery of oil in the 1950's.

Italy is

estimated to have spent 150 million pre-war dollars for agricultural
development, utilities and public works while she was the possessor of
Libya. 14 The fruits of her investments are being harvested by the
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Libyans, not the Italians.

The fruit Italy harvested in the barren land

of North Africa was the bitter fruit of a frustrated imperialism.
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